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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING BELOW
The defendants (collectively the "State" unless otherwise

indicated)

(the

"State

issued an audit of State Coal Lease No. 22729

Lease")

unless

otherwise

unpaid

royalties.

to

the plaintiffs

indicated)
Plateau

and
filed

(collectively

demanded

payment

a complaint

of

for

judgment against the State challenging the audit.

"Plateau"
alleged

declaratory

This appeal is

brought by the State from the District Court's Memorandum Decision

and

Plateau.

Declaratory

Judgment

granting

summary

judgment

for

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction

to hear this appeal under Utah Code sections

78-2-2(3)(e)(iii)

and 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as
follows:
1.

Whether the District Court properly:
(a)

found

the

royalty

provision

in

the

State

Lease to be ambiguous;
(b)

construed the royalty provision

the parties' course of

conduct, which

interpreted

in light of
the

royalty

rate to be $0.15 per ton;

1

In accord with Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, Plateau includes its own statement of issues because it is
dissatisfied with the State's distorted and argumentative statement of issues.

-1-

(c)

found

the

(d)

applied

royalty

provision

was

not

self-executing;
the doctrine

of

equitable

estoppel

against the State;
(e)

found

that

the State may not

retroactively

apply its new policy imposing a royalty rate of 8%;
(f)

found that the State's new royalty policy is

a rule which is invalid because of the State's failure to follow
the provisions of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act;
(g)

found

that

the

State

waived

its

right

to

demand payment of royalties on coal mined during the Audit Period
at any rate higher than $0.15 per ton;
(h)

found

that

the

State

is

not

entitled

to

not

entitled

to

interest on any royalty payment deficiencies;
(i)

found

that

the

State

is

penalties for any royalty payment deficiencies; and
(j)

found

that

the

prevailing

rate during the Audit Period was not 8%.

-2-

federal

royalty

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

lawsuit

centers

on

the

State's

claim

against

Plateau for royalties alleged to be due under the State Lease for
the period of April lr 1979 to December 31, 1984 (the "Audit
Period").

The State Lease, entered

into on March 15, 1965,

provides that a royalty is to be paid to the State of Utah at the
rate of $0.15 per ton or the rate prevailing for federal land of
similar character under coal leases, whichever
144-45).

The

State

Lease

was

originally

is higher (R.

applied

for

and

approved by the Board of State Lands and Forestry (the "Board")
at a royalty rate of $0.15 per ton (R. 144, 368-69, 499).

2

The State's Statement of the Case, and its entire Brief, is
riddled with assertions of fact without references to the Record,
as required by Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 24(a)(7),
and which are in fact unsupported by the Record. Appendix "A" is
a list of such unsupported assertions. The Court has held that
if the appellant fails to provide adequate citations to the record, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct.
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987).
3
Article III, Paragraph 2 of the State Lease provides that a
production royalty would be paid:
(a) at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2000 lbs.
of coal produced from the leased premises and
sold or otherwise disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning
of the quarter for which payment is being
made, for federal lessees of land of similar
character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher

-3-

Plateau and

its predecessors mined under the State

Lease on a regular basis from the date the lease was entered into
until December, 1984 (R. 146, 369, 499).

At all times when

mining was conducted under the State Lease, and during the entire
Audit Period, Plateau paid royalties, and the State accepted
royalties, at the rate of $0.15 per ton (R. 146, 369, 500). This
rate was clearly reflected in each royalty statement submitted by
Plateau and its predecessors with each payment before and during
the Audit Period

(R. 146).

The State accepted

the royalty

payments and royalty statements each quarter without objection
(R.

146-47,

369,

500).

The

lower

court

found

that

this

long-standing and unvarying course of conduct over a span of
nearly twenty years established a $0.15 per ton royalty rate for
the Audit Period (R. 677).
In 1980, during the Audit Period, the State represented
to Plateau that the State Lease was in good standing, but for the
failure to pay 1980 rentals (R. 147, 369-70, 500).

In 1985,

before plaintiff Cyprus Western Coal Equipment Company ("Cyprus")
acquired Plateau, it reviewed the file maintained by the State on
the State Lease and questioned State personnel about the status
of the State Lease

(R. 148). Nothing in the file indicated that

Plateau had underpaid the royalty due under the State Lease (R.
148, 370, 500).

The State personnel represented to Cyprus that

the State Lease was in good standing (R. 148).
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announced

In an October

15, 1985 letter to Plateau, the State

a new policy

relating

to coal

royalties.

letters, the State asserted that under subparagraph

In those
(b) of the

royalty provision (the "prevailing federal rate clause"), royalties for the Audit Period were due at the rate of 8% of the value
of coal mined.
Lease

Amendments

promulgated

According to the State, under the Federal Coal
Act

of

thereunder,

1976
the

("FCLAA"),

prevailing

and

rate

the

regulations

during

the

Audit

Period for all underground federal coal mining operations was 8%
of the coal value.

(R. 149).

The State demanded payment of

4

The contention that federal law requires an 8% royalty rate
for all underground federal coal leases is based upon a misreading of the regulation upon which the State relies. That regulation provides:
A lease shall require payment of a royalty
rate of not less than 8 percentum of the
value of the coal removed from an underground
mine, except that the authorized officer may
determine a lesser amount, but in no case
less than 5 percent if conditions warrant.

43 C.F.R. S 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1986). This regulation does not, as
the State contends, provide for an 8% royalty rate on all
underground federal coal leases. Rather, it requires the Department of the Interior to consider whether a rate of between 5% and
8% should be imposed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
recently ruled that this is the clear meaning of the regulation
in Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir.
1987).
In that case, the court considered the Department of
Interior's assertion that upon the 20-year readjustment of
federal coal leases, the provisions of the regulation require the
imposition of an 8% rate. The court rejected this assertion out
of hand and ruled that the regulation does not "automatically
fix"
a
royalty
rate
of
8%
for
all
underFootnote continued on next page.
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$1,916,909.27 for alleged royalty underpayment, $1,058,545.32 for
accrued interest, $16,158.85 as a penalty, and additional accrued
interest (R. 149, 240).

Summary

The District Court granted Plateau's Motion for Partial
5
Judgment
on the issue of liability for the alleged

deficiency

and

denied

the

State's

Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment (R. 680). The State filed this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Each argument numbered 1 through 6 below is made in the
alternative

because

each

provides

an

independent

basis

for

upholding the District Court's decision.
1.

The prevailing federal rate clause is ambiguous on

its face because it is susceptible to numerous possible interpretations.

The parties' course of performance indicates that they

chose not to attempt

to apply this ambiguous provision

and to

Footnote continued from previous page.
ground coal leases, but rather the Department is required to
consider royalty rates in the range of 5% to 8%.
id. at 507.
Thus, even if the State could apply its new royalty policy
retroactively, that policy would be invalid because it is based
upon a misunderstanding of the federal law regarding underground
royalty rates.
5

Plateau's Motion was partial because it did not include subparagraphs 36(h) and (i) of its Complaint relating to the determination of the value of coal (R. 11). These issues are moot if the
Court upholds the lower court's decision.
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relied

instead

on

subparagraph

(a) of

the

royalty

provision,

which provides for a royalty of $0.15 per ton.
2.

The

self-executing.
prevailing
agreement

prevailing

federal

rate

clause

is

not

Plateau had no duty to pay royalties under the

federal
between

rate

clause

the State

unless

and

and Plateau

until

as

there was an

to the

applicable

royalty under that provision.
3.

The State is estopped from attempting to retroac-

tively invoke the prevailing federal rate clause.

In electing to

mine coal from the State Lease, Plateau relied on the State's
acceptance

of

$0.15

representations
Cyprus

that

per

ton

the

State

relied on the State's

when it acquired Plateau

without

objection

Lease

was

in

representations

in 1985.

and

the

State

good

standing.

of good

standing

If the State is allowed to

repudiate its long-standing practice and retroactively apply the
prevailing federal rate clause, Plateau will suffer great financial injury.
from

Any loss to the school trust fund that may result

estopping

the

State

does

not

constitute

a

substantial

adverse effect on public policy that would outweigh the injury to
Plateau if the State is not estopped.
4.

The

State's

newly

formed

interpretation

of

the

prevailing federal rate clause amounts to a policy that the State
has attempted to apply retroactively in contravention to the well
established

rule

that,

when

prior

-7-

agency

policies

have

been

relied upon, new policies will not be applied retroactively to
the detriment of the relying parties.
5.

Because it has general applicability, the State's

new royalty policy is a rule which, absent compliance with the
Utah Administrative

Rulemaking Act,

is invalid and may not be

applied prospectively, much less retrospectively.
6.

Because

the

State

was

aware

of

the

prevailing

federal rate clause but failed to invoke it in a timely manner,
the State voluntarily

relinquished

and consequently waived

its

right to demand royalty payments at a rate higher than $0.15 per
ton.
7.

The

State's

attempt

to

apply

its

interest

and

penalty rules, which were promulgated after the parties entered
into the State Lease, is contrary to the express terms of the
lease and therefore invalid.
8.
8% of

gross

prevailing

The State is not entitled to summary judgment that
sales

value

is the

applicable

federal rate clause during

royalty

under

the

the Audit Period because

there are issues of material fact that must be resolved before
such a determination can be made.

If this Court holds against

Plateau on arguments 1-6 above, a trial would be necessary to
determine

the

applicable

royalty

federal rate clause.

-8-

rate

under

the

prevailing

ARGUMENT
I.

AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
REVIEW IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

OF

In the section of

"Standard of

its Brief

entitled

Review," the State asserts that the issues before this Court were
decided against Plateau by the Director of the Division of State
Lands and Forestry (the "Director" and the "Division"), and that
the Director's decision should not be overturned unless it is
found to be arbitrary or capricious.

This argument is based on

erroneous factual and legal premises and was not accepted by the
District Court.
Following the issuance of the Audit Report and demand
for payment, Plateau sent a protest letter to the Director in
January of 1986 (R. 497-98).
responded

in a one-page

argument (R. 498).

On March 4, 1986, the Director

letter summarily

rejecting Plateau's

There was no hearing; no legal memoranda,

affidavits or exhibits were received.

The decision was based

solely on the Audit Report and Plateau's protest letter, and the
Director merely reaffirmed the position he had previously taken
in the Audit Report.

The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that

where, as here, there is no record for the court to review, other
than plaintiffs1 protest and the agency's decision, and a complete airing of the issues and facts was not had before the
agency, the court must conduct an independent inquiry and may not
simply defer to the agency's naked decision.
-9-

Denver & Rio Grande

Western Railroad Co, v, Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4
Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955).
Moreover, this case involves issues of contract construction and statutory interpretation and the application of
equitable principles, areas in which courts do not accord agencies any deference.

Because these issues are wholly outside the

Director's expertise, the Court must make its own "independent
determination of the correct application of the governing principles."

Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.r 363 U.S.

263, 270 (I960); see also Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719
P.2d 524, 526 (Utah 1986) (on questions of statutory construction
involving pure questions of law, no deference is accorded agency
determination).

The Director's decision turned on issues as to

which the Division has no expertise, was based on the most superficial of inquiries, and was made by an interested party, rather
than an impartial decisionmaker.

Accordingly, it is not entitled

to deference from this Court.
Aside from the matter discussed above, Plateau agrees
with the State that the Court need not defer to the District
Court in deciding the issues of law presented in this case.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLATEAU WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED
ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND THE LAW.
A.

The District Court Properly Found the
Royalty Provision to be Ambiguous.

-10-

The State asserts that the District Court held that the
royalty

provision

is

ambiguous

"because

the

escalator

clause

required plaintiffs to determine the prevailing rate from facts
outside the lease".

Appellants1

Brief at 19.

This is a gross

misstatement of the District Court's Memorandum Decision.
District

Court

found

the

royalty

provision

to

be

The

ambiguous

because it is susceptible of several different interpretations.
The case law supports this conclusion that the royalty provision
of the State Lease is ambiguous as a matter of law because it is
susceptible

of

many

varying

and

inconsistent

interpretations.

See Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 P.2d
Crestview Bowl, Inc. v. Womer Construction Co.f

548

(1962);

Inc., 225 Kan.

335, 592 P.2d 74 (1979).
Several phrases of the prevailing federal rate clause
of

the

royalty

provision

are

ambiguous.

One

is

the

term

6 "Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several factors not
immediately capable of definitive determination.
The ambiguity
arises as much from what is not stated and provided as from what
is stated.
In other words, at the beginning of the reporting
quarter what is the prevailing federal rate and who makes that
determination, the lessor or the lessee, and what factors are to
be included in making a determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is it prevalent? Who makes the determination that the land in the State Lease and the land in the Federal
Lease are similar in character and what is the basis for determining similarity? What time period is used to determine federal
leases "issued . . . at that time" and who makes that determination? Even if a prevailing federal rate is established, does it
apply to the "value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal
regulation or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State
auditor in his assessment, and who makes that determination?"
(R. 676); see also Appendix "B" attached hereto.
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requiring royalty payments on the State Lease to be matched to
royalty

payments

on

federal

"land

of

a similar

character."

"Similar character11 may mean land with the same quality of coal,
land with the same geologic formation, or land where the costs of
mining and transportation are similar.

It also is unclear to

which geographical area the clause refers.

For example, the

clause could refer to federal coal leases issued in the same
drainage, the same county, the same state, the same region or
across the nation.

Nor is it clear what is meant by "coal leases

issued by the United States at that time."
that time" creates uncertainty.

Use of the phrase "at

Does this mean newly issued

leases or all leases in effect during the reporting quarter?
Does it refer only to producing leases?
what is meant by "rate prevailing."

Finally, it is not clear

"Prevailing" is defined by

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) as:
1:
having superior force or influence:
Efficacious (the - doctrine of wind) 2a: most
frequent (windows facing the - wind) b:
generally current: common (adapted a loose
structure of - ideas to the needs of his own
temperament —M.D. Geismar).
In the context of the prevailing federal rate clause, prevailing
appears to mean the most frequent or common federal royalty
7
rate.
Even the use of this definition creates an ambiguity.

7

This also appears to be the State's interpretation of "prevailing."
They have asserted 8% to be the "prevailing" rate,
Footnote continued on next page.
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What does the most frequent or common rate mean?
percent?

More than fifty

What if the breakdown for lease rates was 33 1/3% at

$0.15 per ton, 33 1/3% at $0,175 per ton and 33 1/3% at 8%?

Was

it the lessee's duty to obtain current lease rates from BLM each
quarter?

What geographical area was to be considered?

Some of

the numerous possible interpretations of the various terms in the
prevailing federal rate clause are listed in the chart attached
hereto as Appendix

n ,?

B .

When the various interpretations of the

key phrases in the clause are combined, there are at least 972
g
distinct interpretations of the clause as a whole.
The underground royalty rates for federal coal leases
in Utah that were in effect during the Audit Period varied from
$0.10 per ton to 12.50% of value (R. 496).

Federal coal leases

during the same time period across the nation had the same range
of royalty rates (R. 496).

In order to determine the most common

federal coal lease royalty rate, Plateau would have had to survey

Footnote continued from previous page.
because they try to achieve some arithmetical majority by asserting that the royalty rate in 19 of 24 newly issued federal coal
leases during the Audit Period is 8%. See Appellants1 Brief at
20.
8
As set forth in Appendix "B", there are four phrases in the
clause that are each susceptible of numerous interpretations.
Using mathematics, the number of interpretations of the entire
clause is equivalent to the number of combinations of the different interpretations of each phrase, which is 972 distinct
combinations.
-13-

all currently issued federal coal leases either at the Utah State
Office or the Washington office of BLM, and survey these leases
at least quarterly (and there were over 200 federal coal leases
in Utah in effect during the Audit Period (R. 496-97)).

However,

even if Plateau had gathered this information, it would have been
impossible for Plateau to determine the prevailing rate because
of the ambiguities in the prevailing federal rate clause.

Even

if Plateau had considered only the federal coal leases in Utah
that it held or ones in which it had an ownership interest, the
royalty rates ranged from $0.15 per ton to 8% (R. 496).
Because

of

these

numerous

ambiguities,

provision does not have a plain meaning
Furthermore,

if the provision

the

royalty

as the State asserts.

has only one meaning

and

is so

straightforward, why is it that none of the owners of the other
five producing
interpreted

state coal

the provision according

153, 156, 372-73, 502-03)?9
unilaterally

leases with similar

attempted

to

royalty

clauses

to the State's reading

(R.

Plateau submits that even if it had
apply

the

clause

during

the

Audit

Period, it nonetheless would be in court today because the State

9

Three other cases involving the same royalty provision and
similar facts have been filed against the State, decided in favor
of the lessee by the District Court and appealed to the Court by
the State: Blackhawk Coal Company v. The Utah Division of State
Lands and Forestry, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 880215; Consolidation Coal Company v. The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 880243; Trail Mountain Coal
Company v. The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, Utah
Supreme Court, Case No. 880300.
-14-

at that time had no idea what the clause meant (R. 154-55, 373,
503) and today with hindsight would probably not agree with such
action.
The State asserts that the prevailing rate clause is an
escalator clause or "favored nation" clause and that escalator
clauses are not ambiguous "if there is a formula or method to set
the price."

See Appellants1 Brief at 19.

However, the State

ignores the fact that there is not an objective formula or method
to set the prevailing royalty because the prevailing federal rate
clause is susceptible of so many different interpretations.

The

cases cited by the State for the proposition that courts uphold
favored nation clauses involve clauses that are unambiguous.

See

Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459
U.S. 400 (1983); Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical
Co. of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980); Lonestar Gas Co. v. The
Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1977).
The State's own officers and employees have acknowledged that the royalty provision is ambiguous.
the Division has demonstrated

In addition,

that the royalty provision

is

10

Consolidation Coal Company is presently involved in a similar lawsuit with the State even though it reached an agreement in
1981 that the prevailing federal rate was $0,175 per ton. (R.
156). See supra, fn.9.
11

The following officers and employees of the Division
acknowledged during discovery in Trail Mountain Coal Company v.
Footnote continued on next page.
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ambiguous by itself adopting different interpretations.

Prior to

1985, the Division interpreted the prevailing federal rate clause
to include only those federal leases that were producing in the
same area.

The Division was not sure of the meaning of "same

area" but would have recommended to the Board that it mean a
"particular drainage area" (R. 154-55).

In contrast, the State

now interprets the royalty provision in this case to have another
meaning:

the State now views the royalty rate to be 8%, relying

in part on all federal leases which have been issued or adjusted
within

the State of Utah since January

1979, regardless of

whether such leases are in production.
the royalty provision mystified other agencies of the
state.

In 1977, the Legislative Auditor General requested an

opinion from the Office of Legislative General Counsel on the
meaning of "land of a similar character" within the context of
the royalty provision

(R. 151-52, 372, 502).

The resulting

Legislative General Counsel Opinion dated April 8, 1977 concluded

Footnote continued from previous page.
The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, District Court
Case No. 4847, a case involving a state coal lease containing an
identical royalty provision (R. 153), that the royalty provision
is ambiguous: Ralph A. Miles, Director of the Division; Donald
G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division; and John Thomas
Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist with the Division (R.
621-24). The Division itself admitted that Mr. Miles "is or was
of the opinion that the royalty provision . . . is ambiguous" (R.
624).
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that "[l]and of similar character is sufficiently vague to defy
definition" with the following analysis:
As used in Article III, SECOND, (c), of
the attached lease, the term "land of similar
character" is so vague as to defy reasonable
definition.
Initially the problem becomes
one of kind, i.e. similar in what regard —
size, productivity, value.
Assuming arguendo, that similarity can be established, the
second problem arises when it is attempted to
establish the magnitude of the lands available for comparison i.e. does the land have to
be similar to land in the same county, state,
region or is the entire United States available for comparative similarities.
Without further explanation in the lease
itself or without knowing the intent of the
parties, any definition given herein would be
totally inconclusive. Thus, since the term
"land of similar character" could be interpreted to have several different meanings, it
is ambiguous.
(R. 152, 372, 502).

In short, the Opinion concluded that the

phrase "land of a similar character" is ambiguous because it has
numerous meanings.
It is patently obvious that the prevailing federal rate
clause

is capable

of

numerous

meanings

and

interpretations.

Thus, the royalty provision is ambiguous as a matter of law.
B.

The District Court Did Not Rewrite the
Lease; It Properly Construed the Royalty
Provision in Light of the Parties'
Course of Performance Interpreting the
Royalty Rate to be $0.15 Per Ton.

The State contends that the royalty provision clearly
provides that the applicable federal royalty rate during the
Audit Period was 8% and that the District Court thus erred in
-17-

construing the royalty provision according to the parties' course
of conduct.
struction

The State presents general rules of contract con-

in support of

its interpretation.

See Appellants1

Brief at 22. Many of the State's cases do not stand for the rule
of construction for which they are cited.12 Further, the State
totally ignores the rule of construction that the courts look to
the interpretation of the parties by their course of conduct to
construe ambiguous contracts (the rule of practical construction).

Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975);

Ackerman v. Sterling Paving Co., 497 P.2d 699 (Colo. App. 1972);
see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 169 W. Va. 310, 288
S.E.2d 139 (1982).
In Ackerman, the lessor brought an action to recover an
alleged deficiency in royalties under a sand and gravel lease.
The Colorado Court
ambiguous

of Appeals concluded

as to the

amount

of

12

royalties

that

the

and held

lease was
that the

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981),
does not hold that "the intent of the parties when entering into
the contract controls the meaning of the contract." Appellants1
Brief at 22. Naqle v. Club Fontainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d
346, 348 (1965), holds that "[w]here the intent and purpose can
be ascertained, it should be enforced in accordance with its substance." Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d
743, 749 (Utah 1982), holds that "[t]his Court will not rewrite a
contract to supply terms which the parties omitted," and that
"the first source of inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its entirety." The holding in Public Service Co. v. City
and County of Denver, 153 Colo. 396, 387 P.2d 33, 36 (1963), that
a contract must be construed liberally to protect the public
interest, is limited to public utility franchise agreements.
-18-

lessor's

continued

acceptance

of

royalty

payments

under

lessee's interpretation of the lease was dispositive.
at 700-01.

the

479 P.2d

The reviewing court found that the evidence supported

the trial court's finding:
That the parties by their conduct before the
dispute arose, have interpreted the lease in
accordance with [lessee's] construction of
its meaning and that the plaintiffs for over
three years, at least since the receiving of
the summary schedule, . . . have adopted
defendant's construction of the lease and
acquiesced in such construction . . . ; that
[lessor's] . . . took no sufficient or
positive
action
to
establish
their
now
asserted construction of the lease.
id. at 700.
In accord with Ackerman

is Bethlehem

Steel Corp. v.

Shonk Land Co., 169 W. Va. 310, 288 S.E.2d 139 (1982).

There the

lessor, after ten years of accepting royalty payments under the
lessee's

interpretation

of a coal

lease, brought

an action to

recover alleged deficiencies, arguing that the lessee had incorrectly

interpreted

the

lease.

The

court

upheld

the

lessee's

construetion, stating:
Our interpretation that royalty payments
were to be made on railroad weights and not
run-of-mine coal . . .
is consistent with
[the lessee's] conduct.
[The lessor's] ten
year failure to object to those royalty
calculations reinforces our reversal of the
trial court's determination that royalties
were due on the run-of-mine coal.
Id. at 146 (footnote omitted); see also Kretni Development Co. v.
Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1934) (party who

-19-

received royalty payments on oil and gas lease based on royalty
rate of
course

7-1/2% for almost
of

conduct

in

eight

years held bound

interpreting

royalty

to parties1

provision);

cert.

denied, 295 U.S. 750; Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Ingram, 560 F.2d
994, 998 (10th Cir. 1977) (parties' construction of ambiguous oil
and gas lease royalty provision for 30 years upheld where both
parties had

knowledge

of

the construction), cert, denied,

436

U.S. 958 (1978).
The

parties'

course

of

performance

indicates

that,

because of the ambiguity of the prevailing federal rate clause,
the parties did not attempt

to apply this ambiguous clause but

chose to base payments on the rate of $0.15 per ton.
the State's position,

rewrite the
13
contract; it simply followed the parties' course of conduct.
The

State

the District

also

asserts

Court

that

the

did

Contrary to

not

parties'

course of

conduct is not an interpretation of the clause, but a modification of the clause.

See Appellants' Brief at 25.

13

Regardless of

The State contends that the District Court's basing a ruling
on the parties' course of dealing was tantamount to rewriting the
Lease and that the Lease cannot be rewritten without approval of
the Director, the Board or the Attorney General.
The statutes
cited by the State do not in any way indicate that the Director,
the Board or the Attorney General have exclusive authority to
speak for the Division. Under section 65-1-1 of the Utah Code,
the Board is granted policy making authority over state lands.
The authority to administer state leases is vested in the Division.
Applying the royalty provision of a mineral lease is an
administrative function. Further, the Director cannot personally
administer all of the State's mineral leases. This function was,
in effect, delegated to the Director's staff.
-20-

whether

the parties' conduct

is termed

an

interpretation

or a

modification, case law supports the proposition that the parties'
course

of

Webster's

conduct
Red

Publications,

Seal
Inc.,

governs

the

construction

Publications,
67

A.D.2d

of

a

Inc. v. Gilberton

339,

415

N.Y.S.2d

contract.
World-Wide

229

(1979),

aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 643, 438 N.Y.S.2d 998, 421 N.E.2d 118 (1981).
In

this

case

Webster

Gilberton in 1962.

sold

its magazine

publishing

rights

to

The 1962 sales agreement required Gilberton

to pay Webster $1000 per issue for five years plus $0.05 per copy
for all copies in excess of 70,000 copies sold of each issue.

In

1963 the parties modified the 1962 agreement by letter agreement
to reduce the payments, except that if the cover price increased
above

$0.35 per

copy, the original payment

agreement would be reinstated

terms

in the 1962

(the "price proviso").

In 1970,

the cover price exceeded $0.35 per copy, but until 1974 Gilberton
continued to pay and Webster continued to accept payments at the
post-1963

agreement

additional

payments

rates.
due under

Webster
the

brought

1962

suit

agreement.

to

recover

The

court

viewed the agreements to be ambiguous and denied Webster's claims
based on the rule of practical construction.

The court

inter-

preted the contract according to the parties' course of conduct
of

ignoring

the price provision, which

modification implied in fact.

the court

Id. at 230.

viewed

as a

In the present case,

the course of conduct of the State and Plateau establishes as a
matter of law that the parties interpreted the royalty provision
-21-

of the State Lease to mean that the royalty rate was $0.15 per
ton."
The State's assertion that the intent of the royalty
rate provision was to insure receipt of market value and the
highest royalty rate paid on federal coal leases is not supported
by the Record.

See Appellants' Brief

at 19, 23 and 24.

15

Furthermore, even if proved to be the parties1 original intent,
the parties' course of performance is contrary to this intent and
should be enforced by the Court.

As stated by the Utah Supreme

Court, the "rule of practical construction is predicated on the
common sense concept that 'actions speak louder than words.'"
Bullouqh v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (1972) (quoting
Crestview Cemetary Ass'n v. Dieden, 356 P.2d 171 (Cal. I960)).
Even if the Court were to view the royalty provision to
be clear on its face, the contract should be interpreted according to the parties' course of performance where such course of
performance is contrary to the wording of the contract.

Eie v.

14

The State asserts, without a reference to the Record, that
because Plateau does not argue $0.15 is the prevailing federal
rate, it concedes that the federal rate is higher than the royalty rate paid prior to 1976. See Appellants' Brief at 21 and
24-25. This assertion is pure supposition and is not supported
by the Record. Plateau does not concede that the prevailing federal rate, whatever that may mean, was higher than $0.15 per ton.
!5
The State does not reference the Record to support its
assertion. Nor does the State reference the Record to support
its assertion that the federal royalty rate was $0.15 per ton on
the date of the State Lease. See Appellants' Brief at 19 and R.
360, 495.
-22-

St, Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d

1190

(Utah 1981); Bullfrog

Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261f 501 P.2d 266 (1972);
Bui lough v, Simms, 400 P.2d at 23.

This rule is based on the

reasoning that the course of performance creates the ambiguity
and that a court should not enforce the wording of the contract
when the parties have demonstrated that they intended the contract to have a different meaning.
In this casef Plateau and its predecessors paid royalties at the rate of $0.15 per ton, a rate which was clearly
reflected on the coal production and settlement transmittals submitted during the Audit Period.
without objection.

The State accepted each payment

By these actions of Plateau and the acquies-

cence of the State, the royalty

clause as a matter of law

required the royalty to be paid at the rate of $0.15 per ton.
C.

The District Court Properly Found The
Royalty Provision Not To Be Self-Executing.

The State views the prevailing federal rate provision
to be self-executing.

In other words, the State believes that

Plateau's duty to pay the "prevailing federal rate," whatever
that may meanf arose as soon as that rate exceeded $0.15 per tonf
without any action whatsoever by the State.

However, the pre-

vailing federal rate clause could not possibly be self-executing
when its meaning

is not clear on its face.

In order to be

self-executing, the prevailing rate would have to be an identifiable fact which could be independently ascertained by either
-23-

party.

The prevailing

identifiable

fact

or

federal

rate clause

objective

market

is not tied to an

standard.

Thus,

the

prevailing federal rate clause is nothing more than an open price
provision under which the royalty rate could only be established
upon agreement, or if not by agreement, then through appropriate
policy-making

or

rule-making

procedures

as discussed

infra at

pages 62-64.
Not only does the language of the prevailing
rate

clause

indicate

dictate

that

that

it

is not self-executing,

the parties did

self-executing.

not

The Application

intend

federal

the

the provision

facts
to be

for the State Lease and Board

Minutes approving the Application and the issuance of the State
Lease at the royalty rate of $0.15 per ton indicate that it was
the intent of the parties that the royalty rate be $0.15 per ton
until the parties agreed to a higher prevailing federal rate or
until the State gave Plateau notice and made a fact determination
of the prevailing federal rate.

Furthermore, the letter dated

February 4, 1985 from the State to Plateau, which outlines the
terms of

readjustment

of

the

State Lease, specifies

that

the

"production royalty rate becomes 8% of gross value of the ore"
(emphasis

added)

(R.

152,

372,

502).

The

use

of

the

word

"becomes" indicates that the rate was not 8% until the readjustment was effective.
This interpretation that the royalty provision is not
self-executing

is consistent with the State's interpretations of
-24-

other state coal leases that contain similar royalty provisions
(R. 153).

By letter dated February 15, 1980 to the lessee, the

State explicitly stated that the royalty provision of the Beaver
Creek State Lease requires a payment of " . . .
of 2,000 lbs. of coal produced
original) (R. 153-54, 373, 503).

15 cents per ton

. . ." (ellipsis signals in
The failure to mention the

prevailing federal rate clause of the royalty provision indicates
that the State viewed the prevailing federal rate clause to be
inapplicable until the State or the parties took action to invoke
the clause.
By letter dated October 4, 1976, the State advised the
predecessor

of Trail Mountain Coal Company

that

it was the

State's policy that the royalty rate payable under the royalty
provision was $0.15 per ton until:
one of two situations which could alter this
rate occur. First Part (b) provides that the
royalty can be changed to the rate payable
under Federal leases in the same area. This
change would be made at such time as the
Federal lease in question begins production.
(R. 154, 373, 503) (emphasis added).

In other words, under the

State's view espoused in 1976, the rate does not change from
$0.15 per ton until the State takes action to change it or until
the parties agree to change it, once there is production on a
federal lease in the same area.
The second situation stated

in the October 4, 1976

letter under which the rate can be changed arises when the lease

-25-

is readjusted at the end of each twenty-year period of the lease
term.

The letter goes on to say:
Under the provision [governing readjustment],
the lease terms including the royalty rate,
will be reviewed as of December 31, 1985, and
I am sure the rate will be changed to the
royalty rate in use at that time.

Thus, it was the intent of the State not to adjust the $0.15 per
ton royalty rate under the royalty provision until the lease came
up for readjustment.
In 1982, Blackhawk Coal Company notified the State that
royalty payments under the Blackhawk State Lease would continue
to be based on the $0.15 per ton rate "since the provisions of
Article 111(b) of this Agreement are inapplicable at the present
time" (R. 155, 373, 503). Blackhawk paid, and the State accepted
without objection, royalty payments at the rate of $0.15 per ton
(R. 155-56, 373, 503).

The State's acceptance of and failure to

object to the royalty rate or the 1982 letter indicates that the
State agreed that the royalty rate was $0.15 per ton until there
was a determination or agreement to the contrary.
The language of the prevailing federal rate clause and
the conduct of the parties show that the clause was not applicable absent an agreement or alternatively notice and a proper fact
determination by the State.

There was no agreement, no notice

and no proper and timely fact determination by the State.
the only

applicable

royalty

provision

in the State

Lease was

subparagraph (a), requiring a royalty of $0.15 per ton.
-26-

Thus,

Because

Plateau paid $0.15 per ton, it complied with the clear terms of
the State Lease and owes no additional royalties to the State.
D.

The District Court Properly
Estoppel Against the State.

Applied

1.

The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Applies Against
the State.

In its most recent opinions discussing the applicability of estoppel to the State, the Court has left no doubt that
the State may be estopped under appropriate circumstances.
Celebrity Clubf

In

Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689

(Utah 1979), the Court stated that equitable estoppel would apply
against the State, but that greater caution must be applied when
the State is acting in its governmental as opposed to proprietary
capacity.
Dept.

of

(1975)).

Id. at 694 (quoting Metropolitan Park Dist. v. State
Natural

Resources,

85

Wash.

2d

821,

539

P.2d

854

Equitable estoppel may be applied against the State,

even when it is acting in a governmental capacity "if necessary
to prevent manifest

injustice, and the exercise of governmental

powers will not be impaired as a result."

Id. (quoting West v.

Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 21 Wash. App. 577, 586 P.2d
516, 518 (1978).
In Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah
1982), the Court stated that, as a general rule, estoppel should
not

be

applied

apparent"

that

against
the

the

State.

application

of

But
this

when
rule

it
would

is

"plainly
result

in

injustice, and there would be "no substantial adverse effect on
-27-

public policy," the doctrine applies against the State.
718.

Id. at

The opinion also points out that courts are increasingly

applying

estoppel

against

state

agencies, consistent

with

the

trend toward holding government and its agencies more responsible
for their actions.

Id. at 718 n.4.

Recognizing
approaches
address

taken

the

establish

that

by

the

estoppel

that

the

there
Court

issue

State

as

is

in

some

these

follows:

acted

in

variation

in

the

cases,

Plateau

will

First,

Plateau

will

a proprietary

or

business

capacity when entering into the State Lease; second, Plateau will
set forth the elements of estoppel as it would apply to a private
party and show that each element

is satisfied under the undis-

puted facts of this case; third, Plateau will show that it will
suffer manifest

injustice

if the State

is not estopped;

Plateau will show that estopping the State will not
exercise

of governmental

State's

impair the

powers or have a substantial

effect on public policy.

last,

adverse

This last section will focus on the

erroneous argument

that

it cannot be estopped

in this

case because to do so would violate the State's trust responsibilities for administering school lands.
2.

The State Acts in a Proprietary
Leasing State Lands.

Plateau

first

focuses

on

the

capacity

Capacity
of

the

When
State

because if the Court holds that the State acted in a proprietary
capacity, the standard for estoppel

-28-

is less stringent and only

the basic elements of estoppel need be satisfied.

In Metropoli-

tan Park, cited as authority by the Court in Celebrity Club, 602
P.2d at 694, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
It must be remembered that when the State
functions in its proprietary capacity, it
will receive no better treatment than any two
private individuals who bring their dispute
before the courts for final resolution.
539 P.2d

859.

However, even

if the Court views the State as

acting in a governmental capacity, the two additional elements of
manifest

injustice and no substantial adverse effect on public

policy are clearly satisfied in this case.
Contrary to the State's assertion, this Court has never
held that the State administers leases of public lands to private
entities
Court's

in
only

conclusion.

a

governmental

decision

on

capacity.

this

subject

On

the

leads

to

contrary,
the

the

opposite

In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d

695

(Utah 1976), the Court recognized that a lessee of state lands
may

assert

estoppel

against

the

Board.

Although

the

Court

refused to estop the Board on the facts of that case, there was
no suggestion that the Board was entitled to special deference or
that it leased public lands in a governmental capacity.
Justice

Maughan,

dissenting

from

lb

the

majority

Indeed,

opinion

and

It cannot be determined from the opinion whether school
trust lands were involved in Morgan, but there is no rational
basis for distinguishing these lands from state lands in general.
The State is required to hold all public lands in trust for the
benefit of the public. Utah Const, art XX, S 1.
-29-

concluding that the facts supported estoppel, was consistent with
the majority in stating:
public lands, by lease.

"Here the State acts to dispose of

It thus acts in its proprietary capacity

and equitable estoppel is a proper remedy."

Id, at 700 (Maughan,

J., dissenting); accord State v. Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N.W. 444,
445 (1925) (state receives lands in sovereign capacity to hold in
trust for school fund, but state acts in proprietary capacity
when selling timber from such lands and is subject to estoppel);
Younqstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328,
344-45 (1963) (state acts in proprietary capacity when it leases
state land even when, by statute, proceeds from those lands must
be deposited in permanent school fund); Durell v. Miles, 53 N.M.
264, 206 P.2d 547, 550 (1949) (state acts in proprietary capacity
when leasing state lands and is subject to estoppel); see also
Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. State, 60 Ariz. 555, 142
P.2d

212, 213 (1943) (distinguishing

lands acquired by state

under Arizona Enabling Act, which are held in proprietary capacity, from lands acquired by state in tax foreclosure, which are
held in governmental capacity); Greene v. Esquibel, 58 N.M. 429,
272 P.2d 330, 336-41 (1954) (same conclusion under New Mexico
Enabling Act).
The State cites Duchesne County v. State Tax Commfn,
104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943), for the proposition that
it acts in a governmental capacity when leasing school trust
lands.

In Duchesne County, the county argued that lands acquired
•30-

by the state through foreclosure of mortgages taken by the state
to

secure

loans

taxation.

The

from
Court

the

State

reasoned

School
that

the

Fund

were

state

subject

held

title

revenues derived from state lands in its governmental capacity,
and was therefore exempt from taxation by the county.

to
to
17

Duchesne

County dealt with the state's amenability to taxation by a local
governmental entity; it did not deal with the state's capacity in
the

leasing of public

lands to private entities.

In Morgan,

however, the Court has indicated the State acts in a proprietary
capacity in the latter situation.

The leasing of state lands to

private entities to obtain a profit for the State, far from being
the paradigm of a governmental function that the State asserts it
to be, is clearly a proprietary or business activity.
3.
In

The Elements of Equitable Estoppel are Established
Under the Undisputed Facts of this Case.
Morgan,

the

Court

set

forth

the

elements

of

estoppel:
Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his
acts, representations, or admissions, or by
his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable negligence,
induces another . . .
to believe certain
facts to exist and that such other
. . .
acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that he
17

Indeed, the Court made a sweeping statement to the effect
that the state always acts in a governmental capacity. 140 P.2d
at 343. This theory has not been followed in subsequent cases.
On the contrary, the Court has explicitly recognized that the
state acts in both governmental and proprietary capacities. See,
e.g., Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 694.
-31-

will suffer an injustice if the former . . .
is permitted to deny the existence of such
facts.
549 P.2d at 697; see also Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).
(a)

Inducement.

Plateau and its predecessors (collec-

tively "Plateau"), mined coal under the State Lease on a regular
basis for nearly twenty years, through December of 1984.

At all

times during this period, including the Audit Period, Plateau
paid a royalty of $0.15 per ton of coal mined under the State
Lease.

This rate was clearly reflected in the coal production

and settlement transmittals submitted by Plateau and its predecessors to the State each quarter.

The State reviewed and

accepted the royalty payments and the coal production and settlement transmittals each quarter without objection.
In May 1980, James T. Jensen, attorney for Plateau,
telephoned

Donald

G.

Prince, the Assistant

Director

of

the

Division, to inquire whether the State Lease was in good standing.

The Division responded with a letter dated May 19, 1980

from Mr. Prince representing that the State Lease was in good
standing, but

for the failure to pay 1980 rentals

369-70, 500).

Understandably, the letter makes no reference to

deficient

royalty

payments, since

the Division

had

(R. 147,

not

yet

adopted the 8% theory.
Cyprus purchased Plateau in August, 1985 (R. 148). In
an attempt to assure itself of Plateau's ownership of the State
-32-

Lease and to identify any outstanding liabilities associated with
the State Lease, Cyprus, prior to consummating

the purchase,

conducted a review of both Plateau's records and the State Lease
file maintained by the Division (R. 148) •

The purpose of this

examination was in part to ascertain whether the State Lease was
in good standing and whether all rentals and royalties due under
the lease had been properly paid (R. 148).

Neither the State

Lease file nor Plateau's own records contained any indication
that

the Division

believed

that

past

royalty

deficient in any respect (R. 148, 370, 500).

payments

were

On May 16, 1985,

Division personnel orally assured John Stewart, a land man hired
by Cyprus to conduct a records search, that the State Lease was
in good standing and that all rental and royalty payments had
been properly made

(R. 148).

With these assurances, Cyprus

consummated the purchase of Plateau on August 30, 1985, unaware
of the State's position that the State Lease was not in good
standing and that over $3,000,000 in past royalties, interest and
penalties were due (R. 148-49, 370, 500).

The State failed to

inform Cyprus of the results of the royalty audit even though it
was aware of the alleged royalty underpayment by March 6, 1985
and had completed the royalty audit by May 29, 1985 (R. 149-50,
370-71, 501).

The Division deliberately withheld this informa-

tion from Plateau and Cyprus until October 15, 1985 (R. 150, 371,
501).
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The State's only response to these undisputed facts is
(1) a muted claim that the representations of good standing made
by

the Assistant

Director

of

the Division

and other

Division

employees did not mean that royalties were paid in full, and (2)
an assertion

that silence will

not support

an estoppel.

See

Appellants' Brief at 35.
The State's first argument smacks of post hoc rationalization.

The State had no definition of good standing, nor did

it have any policies regarding determinations of good standing
(R. 497).

Moreover, regardless of how the State now defines a

representation of good standing, Plateau justifiably construed it
to be a representation that there was no outstanding deficiency
in royalty payments and no question as to the manner

in which

Plateau was calculating and paying royalties.
As to the State's second point, it is clear under Utah
law that silence when a party ought
estoppel.

See Morgan,

549 P.2d

to speak will support

at 697.

The essence

of

an
the

State's claim is that it had no duty to do or say anything with
regard to the royalty provision.

This argument

is untenable.

The State drafted the prevailing federal rate clause and included
it in the State Lease for its own benefit.

The record shows that

the State has long known that the clause is ambiguous.
pp. 15-17.

Because

the clause

is ambiguous on

See supra

its face, the

State could not legitimately have expected Plateau to apply it
without

some agreement

as to its meaning.
-34-

The District

Court

properly rejected the theory that the prevailing federal rate
clause was self-executing (R. 677).

See supra pp. 23-27.

In

other words, the State was obligated to affirmatively act to
invoke the clause.
The State also argues that it had no duty to speak
because it has "thousands" of mineral leases and therefore cannot
be expected to determine if its lessees are in compliance with
the terms of the lease. Appellants1 Brief at 6.

While the State

may have many mineral leases, there were only six coal leases
that were actually producing during the Audit Period, and the
18
royalty provisions in these leases were similar (R. 153, 497).
No audit was necessary for the State to determine how its six
producing coal lessees were calculating royalties.

The produc-

tion

showed

reports

and

settlement

transmittals

clearly

the

lessees were paying at a cents per ton rate, rather than a
percentage of value.

Even if, as the State claims, it did not

have enough employees to check each of these leases every time
payment was made, this does not justify its failure to raise any
question concerning the manner in which its lessees were interpreting the leases, particularly when the State knew at the time
it was receiving payments that the prevailing federal rate clause
was ambiguous.

18
Five lessees were audited.
The sixth was not because it
went bankrupt prior to the audit (R. 452).
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A case

in which a private party

lessor was estopped

from demanding higher royalty payments on an oil and gas lease
than were paid by the lessee supports Plateau's position that the
State should be estopped under

these facts.

La Fitte Co. v.

United Fuel Gas Co., 177 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Ky. 1959) , aff'd, 284
F.2d 845 (6th Cir. I960), involved an ambiguous royalty provision
which

provided

that

the

royalty

was

one-eighth

of

the

gross

income received by lessee but did not specify either the place of
market or the price to be paid.

Over the course of the lease,

the lessee made royalty payments based on the wholesale market
price at the wellhead.

The lessor accepted the payments, with

full knowledge of the basis for payment, without objection.

The

lessor brought

The

court

dismissed

an

action

the

for underpayment

complaint

and

held

of
that

royalties.
the

lessor

estopped from demanding higher royalty payments:
By retention of the royalty checks and
accounting statements by the plaintiff and
its
predecessors,
without
any
objection
whatever, for the long period of years (1924
to 1952), and all of the accompanying circumstances discussed by the court, the defenses
of equitable estoppel and laches are sustained.
Where the lessee renders to the
lessor monthly accounts and makes payments
based thereon which the lessor receives and
keeps without objection, such accounts are
conclusive on the lessor, in the absence of
full and satisfactory evidence of fraud or
mistake.
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was

177 F. Supp. at 68. Likewise, the State is estopped from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the Audit Period at
any rate higher than $0.15 per ton.
The State clearly had a duty to speak

in a timely

manner if it believed the prevailing federal rate clause was
applicable.
this case.

The State's silence alone would support estoppel in
When that silence

is combined with the State's

acceptance of royalty payments for nearly twenty years and its
representations of good standing, the first element of estoppel
is unquestionably established.
(b) Reasonable Reliance.

Plateau relied on the

State's acts, representations and silence in continuing to mine
coal under the State Lease (R. 150-51).
ambiguities of the prevailing

Moreover, given the

federal rate clause, given the

State's actions and statements indicating that $0.15 per ton was
the applicable royalty rate, and given the lack of any reason to
act to the contrary, Plateau did what any prudent and diligent
lessee would do: it paid royalties at the $0.15 per ton rate. 19
The State invokes a recurring but specious assumption
in arguing that Plateau's reliance on the State's actions and
silence was unreasonable:

that the "prevailing federal rate" for

19

As did the four other state coal lessees during the Audit
Period (except for Consolidation Coal Company, which had an
agreement with the State to pay at the rate of $.0175 per ton)
(R. 156, 373, 503).
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"lands of similar character" was somehow self-evident and easily
discernible.

For example, the State contends that Plateau was

not entitled to rely on "erroneous" statements of a government
employee

(apparently

standing),
Plateau.

as

referring

to

the

representations

if such an "error" should

Appellants1 Brief at 34.

of

good

have been obvious

to

Another example of this theme

is the State's assertion that estoppel will not operate in favor
of one who has

a convenient

and

knowledge of the "actual" facts.

available means of
Id.

However, the most stunning

example of the State's misdirected assumption
that

the

State

relied

on

accurately pay the correct

Plateau

obtaining

to

is its contention

"accurately

report

and

royalty amount," and therefore that

Plateau, and not the State, should be estopped.

These arguments

simply ignore the fact that the prevailing federal rate clause is
ambiguous

and

is

not

susceptible

"correct" interpretation.

to

a single

"accurate"

and

The fact that Plateau had federal coal

leases with a royalty of 8% did not make it apparent to Plateau
that 8% was the "correct" royalty

rate under the State Lease.

Under the State's theory, Plateau could never be sure that it was
paying the "correct" royalty because any interpretation of the
"prevailing federal rate" made by Plateau could later be challenged by the State as erroneous.
In

addition,

Cyprus

relied

on

the

State's

representations of good standing and its failure to notify Cyprus
of any deficiency when Cyprus purchased
-38-

Plateau

in 1985.

The

State has argued that Cyprus1 reliance was unreasonable because
Cyprus was aware that the State had conducted a field audit of
Plateau in early 1985, but did not inquire as to the status of
the audit (R. 370).

However, Plateau was regularly audited by

governmental entities.
would

A field audit was not an event which

cause Cyprus or Plateau

payments had been deficient

to be concerned

that

royalty

(R. 500), especially when Cyprus

conducted a search of the State Lease file and was told by the
Division that the lease was in good standing.
Plateau and Cyprus simply had no reason to question the
State's acts, representations and silence, given the ambiguity of
the prevailing federal rate clause and the parties1 long-standing
course of performance.

Thus, their reliance was reasonable and,

as pointed out below, will result in great injury of the State if
not estopped.
(c)

Injury.

Plateau was under no obligation to

mine coal under the State Lease.

Had the State asserted its

present position at any time during the Audit Period, Plateau
would have ceased mining the coal subject to the State Lease and
would have pursued other options, including mining other coal
subject to a royalty rate lower than 8% (R. 150-51).

Had the

State asserted its present position early in 1985 when Cyprus was
contemplating the purchase of Plateau, Cyprus could have pursued
other

avenues

that

are

now

foreclosed,
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such

as

either

not

purchasing Plateau or purchasing it on different economic terms
(R. 150).
If the State is allowed to repudiate its actions and
statements that the royalty rate is $0.15 per ton and is allowed
to exact its claimed royalty at the rate of 8%, and collect
interest and penalties, Plateau will be injured in the amount of
approximately $3,000,000, plus additional interest.

If Plateau

is required to pay this amount to the State, it will have mined
the State Lease at a substantial loss, because mining the coal
subject to the State Lease during the Audit Period at an 8%
royalty rate would result in a negative cash flow of $1.70 on
every single ton of coal mined during that period, and that
figure does not include costs for capital replacements.
would

mean

a negative

cash

flow

over

$1,810,408.20 (R. 150-51, 371, 501).

the

Audit

This

Period

of

In light of these facts,

the State's assertion that "paying what is owed under the lease
is not an injury," Appellants1 Brief at 34, not only begs the
question of what was "owed," it is patently ridiculous.
The State asserts that it disputed the facts demonstrating injury to Plateau by attaching Exhibits 7 to 10 to its
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Appellants1 Brief at 35.

Exhibits

7 and 8 (R. 416, 419) are internal Plateau memoranda that the
State obtained

through discovery.

In its motion, the State

asserted, without further elaboration, that these documents show
that the royalty rate was not a consideration in choosing to mine
-40-

the State Lease (R. 317).

However, these documents, if at all

probative, reflect that the royalty was a consideration in mining
the State Lease and further that the royalty rate of $0.15 per
ton was the only positive factor
Lease.

(See, e.g., R. 422.)

in favor of mining the State

Exhibit 9 (R. 424-25) is a newspa-

per clipping that the State asserted shows the profit Plateau was
making on all its mining operations

(R. 371).

Such

irrelevant

and hearsay evidence does not create an issue of fact in the face
of the affidavits submitted by Plateau showing that the mining of
coal under
265-67).

the State

Lease

was

barely profitable

(R. 211-15,

Exhibit 10 (R. 426-30) is a monthly report which the

State asserted shows that mining the State Lease at 8% would have
been profitable
Exhibit

10

(and

(R. 371-72).
also

As Plateau pointed out, however,

Exhibit

11), summarize

information

for

Plateau's entire mining operations during the periods stated in
the

reports,

501-02).

which

included

mining

under

other

leases

(R.

They do not reflect that mining coal under the State

Lease at 8% would have been profitable.

The trial court properly

found that the State's exhibits failed to raise an issue of fact
and agreed

that Plateau would

show a substantial

loss on all

mining activity under the State Lease if the State is allowed to
retroactively impose an 8% royalty (R. 679).
A private party would be estopped

in this case, and

because the State acted in a proprietary capacity, it should be
treated no differently than a private lessor.
-41-

However, should

the Court find that the State acted in a governmental capacity,
the two additional requirements for estopping the State, manifest
injustice to Plateau and lack of a substantial adverse effect on
public policy, are also present in this case.
4.

Manifest Injustice to Plateau Will Result if the
State is Not Estopped,

Had the State timely informed Plateau that it believed
8% to be the applicable royalty rate, the State Lease would not
have been mined because it would have been unprofitable to do so,
and

the

State

Accordingly,
appropriate

would

have

received

the Division's
royalty

rate,

windfall to the State.

current

no

royalty

assertion

that

(R.

150-51).

8% was the

if successful, can only result

The State would

in a

receive an 8% royalty

from a leasehold that, because of poor quality of reserves or
other reasons, does not justify such a rate and would never have
been mined at that rate.

And it will receive that windfall at

the expense of Plateau, which mined the coal reasonably believing
that the appropriate rate was $0.15 per ton and anticipating that
under such a rate it would receive a reasonable return for its
efforts.

If the State is successful

in its current assertion,

monies earned by Plateau from mining the State Lease, and then
some, will be shifted to the State's coffers
windfall.

An 8% royalty rate would

obligation twelve to thirteen-fold.
be unjust.
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in the form of a

increase Plateau's royalty
Such a result would clearly

5.

Estopping the State Will Not Impair the State's
Ability to Manage School Trust Lands. Nor Will
Denying the State a Windfall at Plateau's Expense
Have a Substantial Adverse Impact on Public
Policy,

The

core

of

the

State's

argument

is

that

the

Utah

Enabling Act and the Utah Constitution somehow require that the
State receive 8% of value under the State Lease.

Specifically,

the State has argued that it cannot be estopped, no matter how
egregious

its

conduct

or

the

injury

to Plateau,

because

the

school fund would be denied additional revenue for coal mined by
Plateau during

the Audit

Period.

However,

a rule

absolutely

proscribing the application of estoppel when adverse impacts on
the school

trust

fund might

result would be unprecedented

and

would be contrary to this Court's view as expressed in Celebrity
Club, Sutro

& Co. and Morgan.

Moreover, the absolute bar to

estoppel sought by the State would not be limited to coal leases
on school trust lands.

What the State seeks is nothing less than

a rule which would give it free reign to repudiate any and all
past

contractual

obligations

and

agency

the disposition of state lands whenever

regulations

concerning

it concludes after the

fact that it did not get the best bargain it could have.

Such a

rule offends all notions of fairness and should be rejected.
The State's "trust" argument, if relevant at all when
the State acted in a proprietary capacity, should be considered
within the analytical framework of Celebrity Club and Sutro & Co.
In other words, the only issue is whether denying the school fund
-43-

additional revenues for coal mined during the Audit Period in any
way impairs the State's ability to manage school lands or amounts
to a substantial adverse effect on public policy.
(a)

Estopping

the

ability to manage school trust
this

case

recently

will

formed

prevent

it

clause, and nothing more.

lands.

from

interpretation

State

of

will

not

Estopping

retroactively

impair

its

the State in
asserting

the prevailing

federal

its
rate

The State incorrectly asserts that a

ruling against it would result in "an ongoing loss of more than
$2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit."
Brief at 18.

Appellants'

This is clearly impossible because Plateau discon-

tinued mining the State Lease before the end of the Audit Period
(R. 146).

As the District Court

noted,

"the State can still

proceed to lease coal lands on any terms it feels profitable and
that will give the State the maximum return.

They still have the

power to revise the wording of their coal leases to do away with
any ambiguity and to carry out any legally established policy"
(R. 679).
(b)
tial

Adverse

Estopping the State Will Not Have a Substan-

Effect

on

Public

Policy.

Two

of

this

Court's

decisions, when read together, indicate what does not constitute
a substantial adverse effect on public policy.
Corp. v. Utah State Univ.y

544 P.2d

887

In First Equity

(Utah 1975), a stock

broker brought an action against Utah State University ("USU") to
recover commissions and other losses incurred because USU refused
-44-

to accept
ordered.

and pay

for shares of stock which

a USU officer

The court held the contract between USU and the broker

was void, not because it was expressly prohibited, but because
there was nothing in Utah law that expressly or impliedly permitted a state university to invest in common stock.

The court

therefore held that because the contract was ultra vires and
void, the stock broker could not recover.

Id. at 893.

Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co,, 646 P.2d 715 (Utah
1982), involved the flip-side of the dispute in First Equity.
This time, USU brought an action against several stock brokers to
recover losses sustained by USU as a result of its investment
program, the same program that had been previously held unauthorized and therefore null and void in First Equity.

The stock

brokers argued that USU was estopped from attempting to recover
these losses.

This Court held that the stock brokers were

entitled to present facts in support of their estoppel claim at
the trial level, even though USU was acting as a trustee in
managing state funds.

id. at 717, 720-21.

The Court reasoned

that there are two types of contracts or activities on the part
of the state:

(1) those that are "malum in se, or which are

strictly prohibited by statute, and thus may be strongly against
public policy," and (2) those such as the contracts with the
brokers that were not authorized by law but which were not
"inherently evil."

Id. at 719. The court stated:

In the former class of cases, it is quite
universally held that no estoppel will lie
-45-

against the government, whereas in activities
which are merely ultra vires the courts are
more likely to allow such a defense; and this
is also true of situations when the governmental entity engages
in proprietary or
business activities.
Id.

Thus, even though the contracts were void and unenforceable

and contrary to public policy, and resulted in substantial losses
of school
against

funds, the brokers were entitled

USU

contracts.

when

it

sought

to

recover

to assert

its

losses

estoppel

under

the

In light of First Equity and Sutro & Co., denying the

State the windfall it seeks here cannot be considered a substantial adverse effect on public policy, even when the effect might
be to deny the school fund some unspecified sum of money.

20

The State argues that its acceptance of $0.15 per ton
during the Audit Period was contrary to the Utah Enabling Act and
Constitution.
either of

See Appellants* Brief at 30.

However, nothing in

these enactments strictly prohibited

accepting $0.15 per ton.

the State

from

Kadish v. Arizona State Land Dept., 155

Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183 (1987), upon which the State relies for
the

proposition

that

a

flat

$0.15

20

per

ton

rate

would

be

The State's assertion that the school trust fund would lose
over three million dollars is based on several incorrect assumptions.
This amount includes the interest and penalty assessed
against Plateau.
As noted infra at pages 66-69, the District
Court concluded as a matter of law that the State was not entitled to those sums. Moreover, the State assumes that 8% was the
federal rate prevailing on lands of similar character. However,
the District Court's ruling made it unnecessary to determine the
prevailing federal rate during the Audit Period.
-46-

"impermissible" and "unconstitutional," Appellants' Brief at 17,
23, is not applicable here.

Kadish interpreted the Arizona-New

Mexico Enabling Act and the Arizona Constitution, which specifically provide that no minerals and other products of school trust
lands may be sold for less than their "appraised
value."

747 P.2d at 1186.

. . . true

The court held a statute providing

for a flat 5% royalty on minerals was unconstitutional under
these provisions. Id. at 1196.
Unlike the Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act and the
Arizona Constitution, the Utah Enabling Act and Constitution do
not expressly and have never been

interpreted

to impose any

substantive or procedural restrictions on the manner in which the
State disposes of trust lands.

The only restriction is found in

section 10 of the Utah Enabling Act and article X, section 3 of
the Utah Constitution, which require that proceeds from lands
received under the Enabling Act be used to support the public
schools.

These laws left it to the Utah Legislature to prescribe

procedures and requirements for the disposal of school lands.
See Utah Const, art. XX, S 1 (school lands to be disposed of as
may be provided by law). The legislature in turn left it to the
Board and Division of State Lands to establish royalty rates.
See Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-18

(1986) (repealed by Trust Land

Management Act, 1988 Utah Laws ch. 121, effective July 1, 1988).
There is no support for the contention that the State's acceptance of $0.15 per ton is "strictly prohibited" by law.
-47-

The State argues that the Utah Enabling Act and Constitution implicitly limit the State's authority in establishing
royalty rates, i.e,f that the State did not have the authority to
accept less than "fair market value," in disposing of minerals
from school lands.

See Appellants' Brief at 28-29.

The cases

cited by the State for the proposition that the Utah Enabling Act
and Constitution require the receipt of "full" or "fair market
value" involved state agency actions or state statutes that were
deemed inconsistent with various other enabling acts and state
constitutions.

See Appellants1 Brief at 12-16.

As noted above,

Kadish involved a statute that was found contrary to particular
provisions

in the Arizona Constitution and Enabling Act.

As

Plateau has pointed out, however, the Utah Enabling Act and
Constitution do not include any provisions related to the manner
of disposing of state lands or the value that must be obtained
therefrom.

Nor have these provisions been interpreted to impose

a general duty to obtain "full" or "fair market" value, however
those terms may be defined.
Moreover, this Court need not decide whether these laws
impose such a duty on the State, because even assuming that they
21
do, and assuming the State breached such a duty in this case,

21

As discussed further below, even if the State had a duty to
obtain fair market value, however that may be defined, there has
been no showing that such a duty has been breached in this case.
An issue of fact exists as to the fair market value of coal mined
under the State Lease during the audit period. See infra p. 53.
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the State is still estopped.

Any adverse impact on public policy

in this case would be of no different nature or degree than that
in Sutro & Co.

Both cases involved actions of state officials,

acting as trustees, that resulted in losses of comparable magnitude to various school

funds.

Moreover,

in this case

if the

State had asserted an 8% royalty during the Audit Period, Plateau
would not have mined coal under the State Lease and the State
would have received no royalty.
its

past

actions

and

to

Allowing the State to repudiate

obtain

such

a windfall

is

strongly

against public policy; estopping the State is not.
The

cases

cited

by

the

State do not

establish

that

estopping the State here would have a substantial adverse effect
on public policy.

In State ex rel Commfrs of Land Office v.

Phillips Petroleum, 258 P.2d 1193 (Okla. 1953), the court refused
to

estop

conveyed

the

state

a mineral

after

it

interest

certain school trust lands.

had,

along

through
with

a

clerical

the surface

error,

estate

in

In Phillips Petroleum, the equities

were clearly not in favor of the party asserting estoppel:

an

examination of the Notice of Sale for the land, which clearly
reserved

the

governing
1199-1200.

the

mineral
sale

interest,
would

have

or

the

revealed

rules
the

and

regulations

error.

Id.

at

The court also noted that the actions of the state

agency in this case, i.e., the giving away of the mineral interest were "clearly" beyond the authority of that agency.
1200.
-49-

Id. at

Phillips is thus distinguishable factually and in terms
of

the

law

it applied.

It

is clear

under

Sutro & Co. that

unauthorized acts alone do not bar the application of estoppel
against the State.

On the contrary, Utah law calls for a balanc-

ing test in this situation.

If the facts of Phillips were before

this Court, it might well find under this balancing approach that
the State should not be estopped.
is in favor of Plateau:

But in this case, the balance

the elements of estoppel are satisfied;

the injury to Plateau is manifest; there was nothing about the
State's conduct that was "clearly" beyond its authority.

More-

over, the State's actions, even under its "breach of trust duty"
theory, were not so strictly and clearly prohibited by law as to
be

strongly

against

public

policy.

Phillips

does

not,

as

asserted by the State, support a rule against applying estoppel
to the State simply because school trust lands are involved.
The same is true of State v. Northwest Maqnesite Co. ,
28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P.2d 643 (1947).

In Northwest Maqnesite, a

mineral lease provided for a royalty of 4% of the receipts from
the

sale

of

minerals

transportation.

after

deducting

costs

of

treatment

and

This method of calculating royalties was explic-

itly required by statute.

However, the lessee and the commis-

sioner of state lands agreed that royalties should be paid based
on 4% of receipts after deducting mining costs as well as treatment

and

transportation

lease and the statute.

costs,

in direct

The court
-50-

stated

contravention

of

the

three bases for its

refusal to estop the state from recovering royalties as provided
in the

lease

rather

than

promise was contrary

the

agreement:

to an express

the

legislative

commissioner's
enactment;

the

commissioner did not have authority to enter into the agreement;
and the lessee did not present sufficient evidence to establish
the elements

of

estoppel,

and particularly

did not

show

that

estopping the state was necessary to prevent manifest injustice.
Id. at

656-58.

Far

from establishing

a per se

rule

against

estopping the state because of its "trust duty," the Northwest
Maqnesite

decided

court

that

closely

estoppel

examined

was

simply

the

facts

of

not

justified.

the
22

case

and

Northwest

Maqnesite, therefore, does not support the State's argument.
In Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948
(Mont. 1985), the issue was whether the lessee of school land
acquired ownership of water diverted or developed on the land.
Id. at 952.

The court held that, because water rights acquired

become appurtenant to land, they became the property of the State
and not the lessee.

Because the leases did not include payment

for the water right, the court wou-d not
22

imply a sale of the

Among the key facts the court relied on were the following:
the agreement was clearly and directly in contravention of the
lease and a state statute; the evidence showed that the lessee
did not rely on the agreement; and there was no evidence that the
lessee was injured. Id. at 657-58. As Plateau has shown in this
case, the State's actions were not clearly contrary to the State
Lease or any statutes; Plateau justifiably relied on the State's
actions; and Plateau will suffer clear injury if the State is not
estopped.
-51-

water to the lessee.

Id. at 955.

A secondary issue was whether

the state should be estopped from asserting an interest
water.

in the

The court noted thatr because of the trust doctrine, the

state had no power to grant

the lessees the right

to develop

non-appurtenant water rights; it also noted that the lessees had
not detrimentally relied on any actions by the state.
956-57.

Id. at

Thus, Pettiboner like the other cases on which the State

relies, did not involve a strict rule against applying estoppel
where school trust lands are involved, but rather was based on
considerations specific to the facts at hand.

These cases are

not dispositive of the present case, in which a balancing test
must be applied to the specific facts.
In sum, this Court should not depart

from prior Utah

case law by holding that estoppel can never be applied when the
school land trust would be denied additional revenue.
the Court

should

hold

that denying

the State

Rather,

the windfall

it

seeks in this case is not a substantial adverse impact on public
policy.
this

The Court should also hold that the undisputed facts of

case

support

estoppel

against

the

State,

injustice to Plateau

if the State is allowed

theory retroactively

is readily apparent.

should

uphold

the District

Court's

finding

and

that

to assert

the

its 8%

In short, the Court
that

the State

is

estopped from retroactively invoking the prevailing federal rate
clause.
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I l t

individual consideration

of leases to determine whether 8% was

the prevailing rate for "lands of a similar character" is necessary.
were

The State need not consider whether any federal
actually

issued

at

the

8%

rate

or,

of

those

leases

that

were

issued, whether any of them covered lands of a character similar
to lands covered by the state leases.
need

not

consider

the

effect

royalty rates of less than 8%.

of

In addition, the State

existing

federal

leases with

23

Prior to its October 1985 demand for additional royalties,

the

royalties

State
at the

had

pursued

$0.15 per

a different
ton

course;

rate from

it

all but

accepted

one of

its

lessees, with no suggestion that the higher 8% rate should apply.
In one instance, the State reached a prior agreement with its
lessee, Consolidation

Coal Company

("Consol"),

rate of $0,175 per ton should apply

that

a royalty

(R. 156, 373, 503).

This

agreement, reached in 1981, was based upon an individual assessment

of the federal prevailing

similar

to that

covered

rate for

by Consol's

lands of

lease.

a character

In reaching

this

agreement, the State relied upon an existing federal lease with a
royalty rate of $0,175 per ton; the Division made no reference to
FCLAA or the 8% rate it now contends was applicable during that
time period

23

(R. 156, 293, 373, 503).

The State!s
p. 73.

interpretation

The State's treatment of

is also nonsensical.

-54-

See infra
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cciillictel

ciih

Depart"
a n 3 <.| a s

i t s fi M.U pi lii

ton

It attempted to apply the new policy retroactively to all royalty
payments
between

that

were

outstanding

the Department

and

its

because
lessees*

of

a separate
The

court

dispute

summarily

dismissed the Department's contention that such a policy could be
applied retroactively:
As for the government's claim that the Secretary might recompute the gas royalties owing
where lessees had not paid the bills previously rendered, in other words, make his June
7, 1937 order retroactive, we think the
[trial] court correctly construed the provision of the lease permitting the Secretary to
fix the value of gas for royalty purposes as
operating prospectively only.
Statutes are
always so construed.
We think that a contract provision as extraordinary as is this
authorization to fix values, should no less
be interpreted as having prospective operation only.
Id. at 821 (citation omitted).

The State is in no different a

position than the federal government was in Continental Oil.

It

cannot, after a long-standing practice of accepting $0.15 per ton
as the applicable

royalty rate under the state

leases, change

that policy retroactively to the detriment of its lessees.
In determining whether an agency may apply a new policy
retroactively, the courts consider whether the retroactivity is
reasonable under the circumstances.

That reasonableness is ana-

lyzed under a balancing test, which weighs the "ill effect of the
retroactive

application"

against

the

"mischief

of producing

a

result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and
equitable principles" if the policy is not retroactively applied.
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See e.q^, al

The State Lease was issued with a Board approved royalty rate of $0*15 per ton.

Until October of 1985, the State's

statements and actions confirmed that this would be the applicable royalty rate under the lease until that rate was changed by a
contrary determination
State

never deviated

or agreement
from

between

this policy

the parties.

until October

The

of 1985.

Because this long-standing practice gave the State's lessees no
notice of its subsequent change in policy, the lessees were entitled to rely upon the former practice and their reliance certainly was reasonable.
At

an

early

date,

the

United

States

Supreme

Court

established that parties may rely on a long-standing agency practice and that such practices are to be given the effect of law
and "considered binding on past transactions."

United States v.

McDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833).

In McDaniel, the Court

determined

additional money

that

the practice of paying

to an

agency employee for the performance of duties outside of his regular employment was an established "usage."

Although there was

no authority for this additional payment, the government was not
allowed to retroactively recover for the compensation paid to the
employee.

w

[0]f necessity, usages have been established in every

department of the government, which have become a kind of common
law, and regulate the rights and duties of those who act within
their respective limits.

And no change of such usages can have a
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could not retroactively apply a new policy to invalidate lease
drawing cards that complied with the prior practice.
1044-45.

653 F.2d at

As discussed supra at pages 10-17, the royalty provi-

sion of the State Lease is ambiguous.

Faced with the inherent

ambiguities of the prevailing federal rate clause and the uncertainty regarding how that clause would be effectuated, Plateau's
reliance on the agency's

long-standing practice of accepting

$0.15 per ton as the applicable royalty rate under the lease must
be viewed as a reasonable response to these uncertainties.
The next two factors to be considered under the Retail
Union balancing test, the extent of a party's reliance on the
prior rule and the degree of burden which the retroactive order
imposes on the party, are similar to the detrimental reliance
aspect of the estoppel doctrine discussed supra at pages 37-39.
As discussed in that section, both Plateau and Cyprus relied on
the State's prior policy, and if the State is now allowed to
alter that policy retroactively, they will be unfairly penalized
for that reliance. As one court has observed:
[An agency] decision branding as "unfair"
conduct stamped "fair" at the time a party
acted, raises judicial hackles . . . .
And
the hackles bristle still more when a financial penalty is assessed for action that
might well have been avoided if the agency's
changed disposition had been earlier made
known . . . .
NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966)
(citations omitted).

Here, the financial penalties imposed on
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P.

The District Court Properly Found that
the State's New Royalty Policy is a Rule
which is Invalid Because of the State's
Failure to Follow the Provisions of the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Under the provisions of the 1985 Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Actf which was in effect when the State announced its
new royalty policy, Utah agencies that adopt new rules must follow the procedures
S 63-46a-3 (1986).

specified

in that Act.

Utah

Code Ann.

The Act defined a rule as

a statement made by an agency that applies to
a general class of persons, rather than specific persons and: (i) implements or interprets policy made by statute; or (ii) prescribes the policy of the agency in the
absence of express statutory policy. . . .
Id. § 63-46a-2 (8) (a) (current version, as amended in 1987 and
1988 provides that rule "applies to a class of persons or an
agency").

The State's new royalty policy requiring an 8% royalty

rate under all of the leases having royalty provisions similar to
that contained in the State Lease is a rule within the meaning of
this statute.

Therefore, it cannot be adopted either prospec-

tively or retrospectively without compliance with the rulemaking
procedures of the statute.
In Williams v. Public Service Commfn, 720 P.2d 773
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court applied the provisions of an
earlier version of the Rulemaking Act to a Public Service Commission decision that it had no jurisdiction to regulate one-way
mobile telephone paging services.
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"rule" was revised in 1985; at the time Williams was decided, the
statute provided that a rule is a statement that applies to a
"general class of persons rather than specific persons"; however,
the Court observed that its conclusion would not be different
were it to analyze the matter under the latter statute.

Id.

at

775 n.7.
Under the rationale of the Williams case, the State's
new royalty policy announced

in October of 1985 was a rule,

which, absent compliance with the procedures of the Rulemaking
Act, is invalid and may not be applied prospectively, much less
retrospectively.

As with the policy considered in the Williams

case, the royalty policy, which affects all lessees having leases
containing the royalty provision at issue here, affects a "class
of persons."

The policy prescribes the policy of the agency and

it represents a clear departure from the prior practice of the
agency.

Under these circumstances, the State should not be

allowed to enforce its policy, either prospectively or retrospectively, until it complies with the Rulemaking Act.
G.

The State Waived Whatever Right It Had to
Demand Payment of Royalties on Coal Mined
During the Audit Period at Any Rate Higher
than $0.15 Per Ton.

The Utah

Supreme Court

has defined waiver

intentional relinquishment of a known right.

as "the

To constitute a

waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.
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extend, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the landlord waived
its right to tax increase payments. _Id. at 80.
Similarly,

Plateau

submitted

to

the

State

royalty

payments and coal production and settlement transmittals that
clearly reflected that payments were made at the rate of $0.15
per ton.

Prior to 1985, the State did not object to the amount

or to the rate of royalty payments.

Further, as discussed supra

at page 24, the State indicated that it would take no action to
increase the $0.15 per ton rate until the lease was up for
readjustment.

Thus, the Division voluntarily relinquished, and

consequently waived, its right to demand royalty payments at a
rate higher than $0.15 per ton.
H.

The District Court Properly Found that
the State May Not Apply its Interest and
Penalty Rules to the State Lease.

In the event that this case is remanded and it is found
that Plateau owes the State any additional royalties, it must be
determined what, if any, penalties and interest are owed.

The

Court should therefore rule on the following issues only if it
remands the case for a determination of the "prevailing federal
rate.11
1.

Pursuant to the Express Terms of the State Lease,
the State May Not Impose the Terms of the November, 1982 Interest Rule on Any Royalty Payment
Deficiencies Should Such Deficiencies be Found to
Exist.
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The State has demanded accrued interest on the allegedly past-due

royalties

in the amount of $1,058,542.32.

This

amount represents interest at the statutory rate of 6% for the
period from January, 1979 through June, 1981; at the statutory
rate of 10% for the period from July, 1981 through November, 1982
and at the regulatory rate of 18%, based upon a rule adopted by
the Board on November 4, 1982, for the period from December, 1982
through October, 1985.
Article I of the State Lease provides:
granted subject

"This lease is

in all respects to and under the conditions of

. . . existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and
regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State
Land Board" (emphasis added).
provides that all mineral

Section 65-1-96 of the Utah Code

leases

issued by the Board prior to

1967 shall be subject to the conditions and provisions contained
in the leases.

Thus, the State Lease is only subject to rules

and regulations existing as of March 15, 1965 (the date of the
State

Lease)

and

"operating"

rules

and

regulations

adopted

thereafter by the Board.
The Board had no rule or regulation regarding interest
when the State Lease was issued.

Thus, there is no regulation

regarding interest which can be applied to this lease.

Further-

more, the Board's 1982 interest rule cannot be applied to this
lease, because it cannot be characterized as an "operating" rule.
The Utah Supreme Court holds that all words must, if possible, be
-67-

given

their

usual

Corp. v. Blair,

and

ordinary

565 P.2d

meaning.

776, 778

Commercial

(Utah 1977).

Building

There

is no

reason not to give the word "operating" its ordinary meaning in
the context of this state minerals lease.
meaning of "operating"

is "engaged

The usual and ordinary

in some form of operation."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971).
The

Board's

1982

interest

rule

is not

a

rule

governs the lessee's actions or operations on the land.

that

If the

interest rule is an "operating" rule or regulation, it is difficult to envision which of the Board's rules or regulation are
"non-operating"
between

and why the Board chose to make a distinction

operating

and

non-operating

drafting the State Lease.

rules

and

regulations

in

The authority to impose new "operat-

ing" rules and regulations on lessees provides the Board with the
opportunity to regulate mining activities on leased lands that
might adversely affect the state's mineral reserves, the public
health and safety or the environment.
clearly

does

authority.

not

fall within

the

ambit

The 1982 interest
of

this

rule

retention

of

Thus, it cannot be applied to any royalty deficien-

cies which may be due under the State Lease.
2.

Defendants Are Not Entitled to Interest on Any
Alleged Royalty Payment Deficiencies for Periods
of Time Prior to Defendants' First Demand for
Payment of the Alleged Deficiencies,

No interest charge, whether based on statute or regulation, may

accrue

in this case until a demand
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is made for the

principal.

This rule was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in

Staker v. Huntington

Cleveland

Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188,

1191 (Utah 1983), which involved a claim for overpayments made by
mistake

to an

irrigation

company.

The

Court

ruled

that

the

prejudgment interest award should only run from the date that the
plaintiff demanded the return of the overpayment and not from the
date

that

the

overpayment

was

made.

Accordingly,

since

the

Division did not make a demand for alleged royalty underpayments
until October

15, 1985,

it has no right

to

interest,

if any,

until after the date of the demand.
3.

Pursuant to the Express Terms of the State Lease,
Defendants May Not Impose the Terms of the December, 1983 Penalty Rule for Any Royalty Payment
Deficiencies that this Court May Find to Exist.

The State has demanded payment of a 6% penalty based on
a rule adopted by the Board in December, 1983.

The argument set

forth above with respect to the Board1s November 4, 1982 interest
rule is also applicable to the penalty rule:

the Board had no

penalty rule when the State Lease was issued and the Board's 1983
penalty
rule.

regulation

cannot

be

characterized

as

an

"operating"

Since the State Lease was granted subject only to existing

regulations and such operating regulations as may be adopted by
the Board, the 1983 penalty rule is not applicable to the State
Lease.
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
STATE1S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The

District

Court

denied

the

State's

Motion

for

Partial Summary Judgment (R. 680), wherein the State requested
the court to find as a matter of law that 8% of gross sales value
was the applicable royalty under the prevailing federal rate
clause of the State Lease during the Audit Period (R. 355). The
District Court's decision was proper because the Record shows
there were facts in dispute necessary to the State's motion.
Furthermore,

the

State

failed

to

assert

necessary

facts

in

support of its Motion, including support for its assertion that
the prevailing federal royalty rate was 8%.
A.

Plateau Raised Specific Issues Showing
That There Are Genuine Issues For Trial.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Foremost among the State's material facts which Plateau
controverted

is the following:

The State asserted that the

"federal royalty rate on leases issued since 1979 in Utah has
been the same regardless of location, quality of coal, etc" (R.
361).

The State's own authority controverts this assertion and

shows that such royalty rates ranged from 5% to 12.5% (R. 496).
-70-

Furthermore, the State's assertion assumes that a change in the
royalty rate pursuant to the prevailing federal rate clause is to
be based only on newly issued leases.
not

comport

with a plain

reading

This interpretation does

of

the clause which

instead

indicates that the rate is to be based on federal coal leases in
effect at the beginning of the quarter.

See infra, pp. 72-73.

The royalty rates for federal coal leases in effect during the
Audit Period ranged from $0.10 per ton to 12.5% of value in Utah
and across the nation.
B.

The State Failed To Assert Facts In
Support Of Its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.

Among
support

of

the facts which

its

Motion

for

the State failed to assert

Partial

Summary

Judgment

are

in
the

following:
1.
Exhibit

1

to

Facts establishing that the leases referred to in
the

Affidavit

of

Robert

Lopez

(attached

as

an

exhibit to Defendants' Summary Judgment Memorandum) (R. 468) are
for "land of similar character" or are otherwise relevant to the
prevailing federal rate clause.
2.

Facts

establishing

that

8% was

the

"prevailing

rate" for "coal leases issued by the United States."
3.

Facts establishing that 8% was the prevailing rate

for federal coal leases for land of a similar character in effect
at the beginning of each quarter of the Audit Period.
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In
material

sum,

because

Plateau

raised

genuine

issues

of

fact and because the State did not establish facts

supporting its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the District
Court properly denied

the State's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment.
C.

It Cannot Be Said That The Prevailing
Federal Royalty Rate During The Audit
Period Was 8%.

The

State

argues

that

the meaning

of

the

royalty

provision is clear and that the prevailing federal rate clause
requires payment of royalties at the rate of the majority of the
federal

coal

leases

newly

issued during

the Audit Period.

According to the State, under FCLAA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, the prevailing rate for all underground federal
coal leases after 1976 was 8% of the coal value.
n.4.

See supra p. 5

The State claims that the majority of such leases were

issued at the royalty rate of 8%, and that therefore the royalty
rate payable under the royalty provision was 8%.
Contrary to the State's position, the wording of the
prevailing federal rate clause does not indicate that it refers

24

See Affidavit of Ralph Aiello, H 5 (R. 451), wherein Mr.
Aiello, an auditor for the State, states, ff[a]fter reviewing
Article III of the state coal lease regarding royalty rate [sic],
I started gathering information to determine that royalty rate
was required to be paid by the lessees since the leases required
payment of 15 cents per ton or the rate charged for federal
leases issued in the quarter the royalty was due on lands of similar character, whichever was higher" (emphasis added).
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only to newly issued leases, and the State offers no authority
for such an interpretation.

In addition, the clause does not

refer to leases issued during the quarter but rather to leases
issued "at the beginning of the quarter," which could mean that
it refers to all leases
quarter.

issued before the beginning

of the

Consideration of all federal leases that were in effect

during the reporting quarter would certainly comport with a plain
reading of the clause and would result in a practical application
of the clause.
The State's interpretation that the clause refers only
to newly issued leases issued in Utah during the reporting period
is also nonsensical.

Application of this interpretation would

result in a royalty rate payable under the lease of $0.15 for
some reporting quarters when no new federal leases were issued,
but

8%

for other quarters when

federal

leases were

issued.

Specifically, as set forth in Appendix XVI to Plateau's Reply
Memorandum (R. 597), Plateau was in production during 22 of the
23 quarters during the Audit Period.

There were newly issued

leases during only 10 out of 22 producing quarters.

Thus,

application of the State's interpretation of the royalty provision would result in a royalty rate of 8% for 10 quarters and
$0.15 per ton for 12 quarters.
The State has not submitted facts showing that 8% was
the prevailing rate for federal coal leases of land of similar
character in effect during the Audit Period.
-73-

The underground

royalty rates for such leases varied between $0.10 per ton and
12.5% of value (R. 496). A trial would be necessary to determine
the prevailing rate for coal leases of land of similar character
during the Audit Period.
CONCLUSION
When the State Lease was issued in 1965, it was issued
at the fixed royalty rate of $0.15 per ton.

Plateau paid, and

the State received, royalty payments at the rate of $0.15 per ton
on coal mined under the State Lease from 1965 through 1984.

The

Division did not object to the amount of royalty payments or the
royalty rate until 1985.

The State represented to Plateau in

1980 that the State Lease was in good standing.

Plateau relied

on these representations and the State's failure to object to
royalty payments in choosing to mine coal under the State Lease.
In 1985, after Plateau had discontinued mining the State Lease,
Cyprus questioned the State as to whether there were any outstanding liabilities associated with the State Lease.

The State

indicated that the lease was in good standing, and failed to
inform Cyprus of the audit report findings.

Cyprus relied on the

State's representations and silence in acquiring Plateau.

The

State is now deviating from its twenty-year course of performance
and is attempting to impose retroactively a novel interpretation
of the State Lease which would injure Plateau in the amount of
approximately $3,000,000.00.

-74-

Coal subject to the State Lease was of marginal quality
and mining it was barely profitable under the rate actually paid.
Mining the coal would not have been economic at a royalty rate
higher than $0.15 per ton.

Had the State demanded a higher rate

at any time during the Audit Period, Plateau would have ceased
mining under the State Lease, and thereafter the State would have
received no royalties whatsoever.
royalties

would

result

in

an

To give the State

unconscionable

increased

windfall

to

the

State.
This
supporting

case

estoppel

is

a

textbook

against

the

example

State.

The

of

circumstances

undisputed

facts

clearly support a holding that the State is estopped from demanding any royalty payment other than the $0.15 per ton that it has
already been paid.

Any other ruling by the Court would result in

a serious injustice to Plateau.

The State's trust argument is

overshadowed by this injustice and the fact that the school land
trust

would

be poorer

today

if the State had asserted

an 8%

royalty during the Audit Period because Plateau would not have
mined the State Lease.
The findings and the judgment of the District Court are
supported by the Record and should thus be upheld by the Court.
If the Court finds that a royalty other than $0.15 was required
to be paid by Plateau during the Audit Period, this case should
be remanded to the District Court
royalty rate.
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APPENDIX A
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS OF THE STATE
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
Appellants' Brief at 4:
"The Director, after a hearing,
upheld the audit and the demand for payment."
The State's
citation to page 436 of the record does not support this
assertion.
Appellants' Brief at 4: "The United States Government owns
most of the coal-producing lands within the State of Utah."
Appellants' Brief at 5:
"When State Lease no. 22729 was
issued by the State, the royalty rate on many federal coal
leases was $.15 per ton."
Appellants' Brief at 5:
"The federal coal lease royalty
rate generally remained at $.15 per ton until August 4,
1976."
Appellants' Brief at 6:
"Instead the State of Utah, as
written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires
its lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the
correct amounts of royalties."
Appellants' Brief at 7:
"Plaintiffs, upon receipt of the
audit report, requested a hearing before the Director of the
Division of State Lands. A hearing was held."
Appellants' Brief at 16: "The market royalty rate on coal
leases, in the state of Utah, is controlled by the United
States which has the vast majority of coal reserves.
Lessees require long-term leases because of the capital
expenditures involved."
Appellants' Brief at 17:
"The State therefore, drafted an
escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the royalty
revision to the prevailing federal rate.
That escalator
clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of
the lease, receive full market value."
Appellants' Brief at 18:
" . . . with an ongoing loss of
more than $2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit."
Appellants' Brief at 19:
"A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III Second) shows that it is
clear and complies with the intent of the parties that the
trust lands receive the going royalty rate. It states that
the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was the federal
rate when the lease was signed). . ."

11.

Appellants' Brief at 20:
"Plaintiffs have the
determine any change in the federal royalty rate."

12.

Appellants1 Brief at 20: "The federal government owns the
majority of coal reserves in Utah."

13.

Appellants1 Brief at 21: "The Plaintiffs . . . concede that
the federal rate is higher than the royalty payment they
paid prior to 1976."

14.

Appellants' Brief at 23: "The Federal Government owns the
majority of coal reserves in the State of Utah and therefore
the royalty rate charged by the Federal Government constitutes the prevailing market rate in the State of Utah. At
the time the lease provision was drafted the federal royalty
rate was generally $.15 per ton."

15.

Appellants' Brief at 23: "The escalator clause was required
by law and the obvious intent of the parties, when the
contract was entered into, was to provide a mechanism
whereby the State would always receive the going market
royalty rate from its trust lands."

16.

Appellants' Brief at 24: "One of the things that is certain
about the royalty provision, in addition to the plain
meaning of Subsection b, is that the contracting parties
intended that the royalty rate would change if federal
royalty rates increased."

17.

Appellants' Brief at 25: "Their silence concedes that the
rate is something higher than $.15."

18.

Appellants' Brief at 25:
In this particular case the
undisputed facts establish that the prevailing federal rate
is 8% of value. Any changes in the rate can be easily
determined by review of Bureau of Land Management records."

19.

Appellants' Brief at 34: "Indeed, the undisputed facts show
that it was the State that relied on the Plaintiffs to pay
the correct royalty amount. The Plaintiffs had the duty to
the State to calculate and pay the correct royalty.
The
State did not have a duty to Plaintiffs to collect the
correct royalty although it has such a duty to the school
trust."

20.

Appellants' Brief at 6:
"The lands that the Division of
State Lands manages have thousands of mineral leases."

21.

Appellants' Brief at 6:
"Like reporting
largely been an honor reporting system."
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taxes,

duty

to

it has

22.

Appellants' Brief at 9:
"The State has a . . . moral duty
to obtain full value from the disposition of those lands."
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APPENDIX B
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF
THE STATE LEASE ROYALTY PROVISION
Royalty Provision
Language:

To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the
15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a)

at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2000
lbs. of coal produced for the
leased premises and sold or otherwise disposed off or

(b)

at the rate prevailing, at the
beginning of the quarter for which
payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,

whichever is higher .
Ambiguous
Phrase

Different
Interpretations

"at the rate prevailing"

1.
2.
3.

'federal lessees of land
under coal
1
leases

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

the rate of the majority
of leases
an average of rates
the highest rate
all federal coal leases
in the nation
federal coal leases in
the West
federal coal leases in
Utah
federal coal leases in
the same region
federal coal leases in
the same county
federal coal leases in
the same drainage area
federal coal leases in
the same mine
producing
federal coal
leases
non-producing
federal
coal leases

"land of similar character11

Land with:
1.
similar
geological
or
physical characteristics
2.
similar access characteristics
3.
similar degree of development completed
4.
coal with similar fuel
utilization potential
5.
similar environmental or
regulatory restrictions
6.
similar
labor
force
availability

"coal leases issued by the
United States at that time"

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

072788A
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all federal coal leases
in effect on the date of
the
beginning
of
the
reporting quarter
all federal coal leases
in
effect
during
the
reporting quarter
all federal coal leases
in
effect
during
the
Audit Period
federal coal leases newly
issued on the date of the
beginning of the reporting quarter
federal coal leases newly
issued during the reporting quarter
federal coal leases newly
issued during the Audit
Period

